Talk:German battleship Scharnhorst

Article overhaul

In working to finish this, I've started a complete rewrite of this article here. Feel free to lend a hand if you have the time, but I ask that you only do so if you have access to reliable sources—this article will eventually go to FAC and we don't need to spend time redoing things because they weren't properly sourced the first time. Though based on the response I got when I overhauled Bismarck class battleship, I doubt this will generate much of anything... Parsecboy (talk) 21:27, 11 January 2011 (UTC)

ship motto

I am just curious. I remembered reading in Otto Busch that the Scharnhorst had as motto "Scharnhorst voran" and so I put that in (initially incorrect). Why was it taken out? Hpvpp (talk) 09:38, 13 January 2011 (UTC)

I rewrote the article in a userspace draft and didn't incorporate anything from the old version. Do you happen to know what page it's on in Busch? I have his book, but didn't notice it anywhere (though it's quite possible I missed it). Parsecboy (talk) 09:54, 13 January 2011 (UTC)

I have the book as well, but I can't find it either. Sorry, no time. Even so, look here http://www.germanmilitaryhistory.com/blog/51484-scharnhorst-immer-voran/ Hpvpp (talk) 21:32, 13 January 2011 (UTC)

Busch p. 145, 2nd page of Ch.XVI, also p. 150. Hpvpp (talk) 22:00, 13 January 2011 (UTC)

Thanks for finding that, though it's page 127 in my edition. Parsecboy (talk) 04:00, 14 January 2011 (UTC)

not sure how to add an nopther issue but have several, the article states the oiltanker and passneger boat were sunk by the ugly isters they werent tha was the estroyer escort that aprted company with the scharnhorst according to the gemran footage , the sruvivors being taken aboard fom the tanker onto the admiral hipper, the film claerly states this, the original german narration and footage are in direct conflict with the article.

"Scharnhorst and Gneisenau had reached a point north-west of Lofoten, Norway, by 12:00 on 9 June. The two ships then turned west for 24 hours while temporary repairs were effected. After a day of steaming west, the ships turned south and rendezvoused with Admiral Hipper on 12 April. An RAF patrol aircraft spotted the three ships that day, which prompted an air attack. The German warships were protected by poor visibility, however, and the three ships safely reached port later that day. Scharnhorst returned to Germany, and was repaired at the Deutsche Werke in Kiel. During the repair process, the aircraft catapult that had been installed on the rear gun turret was removed.[19]

The two ships left Wilhelmshaven on 4 June to return to Norway. They were joined by Admiral Hipper and four destroyers.[20] The purpose of the sortie was to interrupt Allied efforts to resupply the Norwegians and to relieve the pressure on German troops fighting in Norway.[19] On 7 June, the squadron rendezvoused with the tanker Dithmarschen to refuel Admiral Hipper and the four destroyers. The next day, a British corvette was discovered and sunk, along with the oil tanker Oil Pioneer. The Germans then launched their Arado 196 float planes to search for more Allied vessels. Admiral Hipper and the destroyers were sent to destroy Orama, a 19,500 long tons (19,800 t) passenger ship, while Atlantis, a hospital ship, was allowed to proceed unmolested. Admiral Marschall detached Admiral Hipper and the four destroyers to refuel in Trondheim, while he would steam to the Harstad area.[20]"

and this bit? all of a sudden the 9th of june comes and there is an attack? a day after the sinking of the glorious? the 6th and 7th are the sinkings of the oil tanker and the passenger ship are mentioned as simulatneous to the battle for the glorious.

the ugly sisters are "released on a special mission" accoring to the film from the hipper and the destroyers...

was it really that chance a meeting? they were scouting the area for the norwegian retreat, the vents onto he scharnhrt leading up to the sighting of glorious are interesting... the intercepted battle orders that wer heard at bletchley but not decoded? what did they say excatly? — Preceding unsigned comment added by 149.254.49.133 (talk) 18:17, 3 August 2015 (UTC)

no external links?

The Gneisenau has some external links so why not the Scharnhorst? I think this website should be mentioned http://www.scharnhorst-class.dk/index.html and http://wn.com/Die_Deutsche_Wochenschau has archival footage. Hpvpp (talk) 21:26, 14 January 2011 (UTC)

The problem is, all of the photos on the first website and the footage linked to on wn.com (which is actually just a collection of youtube videos) violate copyright. We therefore can't link to either of them (and once I finish rewriting Gneisenau, it won't have any either). Parsecboy (talk) 21:43, 14 January 2011 (UTC)

That is a problem for them, sure, but why would it be a problem for us? Hpvpp (talk) 06:40, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Per WP:EL, we can't link to sites that violate copyrights. Parsecboy (talk) 07:21, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

Okay. How about http://www.archive.org/details/GermanBattlecruisersScharnhorstOnPatrol (via http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Category:Deutsche_Wochenschau) Hpvpp (talk) 11:12, 15 January 2011 (UTC)

There's no indication that archive.org licensed the images under the Creative Commons license as claimed on the Commons page (or even that the website holds the copyright, which I'd bet they don't). They are most assuredly still under copyright in Germany, which means they're still copyrighted in the US as well (unless they have some sort of status as seized Nazi assets as some photos do, though this has not been asserted or proved). We can't use any of these clips. Parsecboy (talk) 03:26, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

Mmm, I would have thought there be guardians in Wikipedia (etc) to ensure that whatever is uploaded is indeed not in violation. Indeed, the phrase which I see underneath this editing box "Content that violates any copyrights will be deleted" leads me to believe that this is the case and so I suspect that you are overly cautious. Hpvpp (talk) 04:08, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

Look, copyright violations are uploaded to Wikipedia and Commons all the time, and most of it takes months or even years to be found and deleted. I've also been to FAC over 20 times, and I know what the image reviewers will say if we use this material in the article. It's a copyright violation, and therefore unusable in this or any other article. Parsecboy (talk) 12:15, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

FWIW, I've nominated all of the videos for deletion here. Parsecboy (talk) 12:37, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

What would be the point of the external links? I can see a point in an external link to a street-map for an article on a town. I can see a point to an external link to detailed ship plans for a warship. In a stub/start article there can be value in external links that could be used to expand the article. Pointless external links best deleted. External inks to stolen imagery implies approval of copyright theft and is therefore unethical.--Toddy1 (talk) 19:20, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

And so I learned something new. Thanks, Parsecboy & Toddy. Hpvpp (talk) 20:53, 3 February 2011 (UTC)

no mention of the "ugly sisters"?

Scharnhorst and Gneisenau have been referred to as the "ugly sisters" according to many sources on the web. Even if no good source can be found it still should be mentioned. One of the videos on http://wn.com/Die_Deutsche_Wochenschau actually has an overprint with those words. Hpvpp (talk) 23:40, 14 January 2011 (UTC)

You would have to have eyes of solid lead to call them "ugly". Not to mention it's hardly encylopedic.

The name is a reference to the pantomime "Cinderella" - "the Ugly Sisters" (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) never got to dance with Prince Charming, whereas "Cinderella" did. "Cinderlla" was either the Bismarck or later the Tirpitz. It was a joke.

Not at all accurate - the sisters in Grimm's version (i.e., the version that would have been most well known in Germany) were beautiful - the "ugly sisters" nickname was a British creation. They were also nicknamed "Salmon" and "Gluckstein" by the RN. But neither set of nicknames is particularly encyclopedic. Parsecboy (talk) 13:04, 22 January 2016 (UTC)

Salmon & Gluckstein was a British chain of tobacconists' shops. The derisive use of those nicknames for Scharnhorst and Gneisenau was commonplace at the time and is mentioned in numerous sources. 'The Ugly Sisters' was because they were generally bad news, not because they were ill-designed. Khamba Tendal (talk) 22:05, 18 November 2023 (UTC)

...And it seems that "Ugly Sisters" was a nickname for the "Nelson" and "Rodney" years before these ships were built that somehow got swapped over. Well. "Nelson" and "Rodney" actually were ugly ships. 2404:4404:147B:E400:6166:E581:BE07:363D (talk) 13:36, 14 January 2024 (UTC)

Confusion?

Is this a fault or just confusingly written?

Six minutes after opening fire, Scharnhorst scored a hit at a range of 24,100 m (26,400 yd). ... By 18:26 the range had fallen to 25,600 m (28,000 yd),...

Was 18:26 before the six minutes after opening fire? Then why is it metioned afterwards?--WerWil (talk) 23:34, 19 May 2011 (UTC)

I came to ask the same thing. It says:

  "At 17:45, the German battleships spotted the British aircraft carrier Glorious and two escorting destroyers, Ardent and Acasta, at a range of some 50,000 m (55,000 yd). Scharnhorst was closer and therefore fired first.[21] Six minutes after opening fire, Scharnhorst scored a hit at a range of 24,100 m (26,400 yd). The shell struck the carrier's upper hangar and started a large fire. Less than ten minutes later, a shell from Gneisenau struck the bridge and killed Glorious‍ '​s captain.[22] The two destroyers attempted to cover Glorious with smoke screens, but the German battleships could track the carrier with their radar. By 18:26 the range had fallen to 25,600 m (28,000 yd), and Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were firing full salvos at the carrier"

It seems to imply that she first started firing at 24,000 yards, yet later the "range had closed to 28,000 yards". It's either wrong, or confusingly written. If it's correct, the bit about the range being closed to 28,000 yards and beginning to fire full salvos ought to precede the part where she makes a hit at 26,000 yards. It seems to be saying that they began firing with less than full salvos, and managed to score deadly hits, and later got closer and began with full salvos, yet the numbers don't add up. If they're right, it ought to say that they started at 55,000, closed to 28,000, began to fire full salvos, and at 26,000, scored the hits..45Colt 08:47, 14 November 2015 (UTC)

Still not fixed 4 years later, and there is the added point of an un-referenced claim in the lead claiming a record for longest range naval hit. Given that the guns had a theoretical range of 40,000 m - 25,000 m seems a bit low for such a claim - is this the hit being mentioned? I don't have the references at hand to fix this or I would. - NiD.29 (talk) 05:59, 25 November 2019 (UTC)

File:HMS Glorious last picture.jpg Nominated for Deletion

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Frequency of damage

I know I've read of numerous other ships that were repeatedly damaged in action, but the frequency with which the Scharnhorst was damaged and forced to dock for repairs (both by enemy action and by weather) seems remarkable. Seems I recall the Gneisenau suffering similarly. Not sure whether I'd call that lucky or unlucky, but I'd be interested to see how the numbers compare to other ships. How many other naval vessels were subjected to enemy attack, injured, repaired and returned to be damaged again with such frequency? It's also curious that some of the secondary damage mentioned (turrets jammed by mine explosions, etc) seems to be excessive; I've read of other ships hitting mines, being hit by AP bombs, etc, and basically shrugging the damage off (relatively speaking). Yet it happened a number of times to the Scharnhorst. Not to mention that she seems to end up "a meter down" in the water on 4-5 occasions. Is that a symptom of her relatively light weight and protection, mere bad luck, or was flawed engineering a factor? Or was it just because she was one of only a few heavy German surface vessels, and so was unusually heavily engaged, and therefore took an unusual brunt of the enemies wrath?.45Colt 09:15, 14 November 2015 (UTC)

Fact or Fiction?

In the article: "With only turret Caesar operational, all available men were sent to retrieve ammunition from the forward turrets to keep the last heavy guns supplied[63]" - I cannot believe that it is possible to retrieve ammunition weighing some 100s of pounds and carrying it inside a ship along a distance of 200 feet which is under constant fire! This can only be pure fiction or a bad translation! 84.155.58.33 (talk)

That's what Garzke & Dulin say, and they're both noted naval historians. Parsecboy (talk) 11:50, 3 May 2016 (UTC)

Have you ever examined the method of handling these large shells inside the magazine underneath the turret? If someone can get a shell into a hoist when the ship is travelling at speed in rough conditions, moving shells from one part of the ship to another is not really a lot more difficult. Add a bit of desperation, and the job is achievable. Anyway, how do you think the shells were got into the magazine in the first place, especially if replenishing at sea? (The method of moving shells in the turret involves looping a chain around the shell and then pulling it to where you want it to go - it needs a lot of dexterity with the chain!)
ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 23:37, 17 June 2018 (UTC)

Air raid on 24 July 1941

The raid on the Scharnhorst on 24 July 1941 is described in the wartime book Tail Gunner by R C Rivaz. Whilst wartime security makes the book a less than complete account of the attack, the aircraft are undoubtedly Halifax's. A website whose provenance I am not able to establish gives a fuller account, confirming the story in the book.

A quality confirming source appears to be needed for this point. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 23:20, 31 December 2016 (UTC)

References

The sentence is question is covered by the citation to Garzke & Dulin. Parsecboy (talk) 23:27, 31 December 2016 (UTC)

Noting that the article has already been amended in line with my understanding of the correct details of the raid, the question remains on the source. Does Garzke & Dulin support this revision? I do not have a copy available and I am not sure if I understand the extent of the answer above. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 00:22, 1 January 2017 (UTC)

This [[1]] seems to tell of a far more complex series of operations that day. Irondome (talk) 00:28, 1 January 2017 (UTC)

I tracked down and added the original source [[2]] but based on the new material, I am puzzled. Irondome (talk) 00:35, 1 January 2017 (UTC)

Wouldn't be the first time that a cited source contains an error. Are you saying that you have had sight of Garske and Dulin, or just spotted it in the cross reference to the B17 in Wikipedia? The rest of the original text - mention of B24s seems wrong, as all the early B24s were highly valuable for their long range, and La Rochelle is not much of a long trip. I am researching further, but will take a few days to access good sources.ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 00:46, 1 January 2017 (UTC)

No, I seem to recall digging it up on Google books. Their work was not previously on WP as far as I could see. But it is nearly 2 years back, and it was probably late at night. I think the authors have just confused the types that made the hits. There is also this [[3]] which is quite explicit as to 90 squadrons' B-17 experiences that day. The B-24 mention I have nothing to do with! I think that was added later by someone else. Even without sources, I knew that was just daft. Irondome (talk) 00:54, 1 January 2017 (UTC)

Looking at Garzke and Dulin (pg 159) they are both right and wrong: they say that the aircraft were Halifax Bombers, but say they were from several squadrons. I am satisfied from other sources that there were 9 aircraft from 35 squadron and 6 from 76 squadron involved in this raid - so "several" is a bit misleading. I think the other aircraft types that were shown in the article until recently are an example of how someone can sneak in a change that does not match a source - and it just stays there until challenged. I am sure some deep philosophical comment about the way Wikipedia works is appropriate - but fortunately words escape me.

Just spotted that this error arrived on 12 Jan 2011 when a lot of editing was done "outside" of the article. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 20:55, 14 January 2017 (UTC)

Incorrect times in account of Glorious/Ardent/Acasta action

The account of the action with Ardent, Acasta and Glorious seems to have combined times from 2 sources which report this action based on different time zones. The start of the action is listed as 1745 with the initial sighting. The cited source, Garzke & Dulin, gives this time as 1645 and this is confirmed by Koop and Schmolke.

It is accepted that the discrepancy might be, for instance, due to an adjustment by an editor to GMT (or some other time zone). However, the torpedo hit is timed at 1839 in the article, citing Garzke & Dulin, and this matches the source (and also Koop and Schmolke). So if an adjustment to time zone has been made, it has not been done consistently.

It is possible that the confusion on times is the source of the problems with ranges, as shown in the "Confusion" section shown above.

It appears that this part of the article needs to be re-researched and rewritten. (Perhaps also solving the problem that the account is difficult to follow, even with the log transcripts that appear in Koop and Schmolke to assist in comprehension.)

ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 21:23, 18 January 2017 (UTC)

HMS Glorious article has 3:46 PM GMT as time of first spotting and action ending at 6:20 PM GMT with sinking of Acasta. The action desription and times are a bit lacking here vs presentation at the Glorious article.--Denniss (talk) 23:54, 18 January 2017 (UTC)

References

Air raid on 24 July 1941 (again)

I have made some changes to the details of the air raid at La Pallice on 24 July 1941.

Firstly, Koop and Schmolke are quite definite that the intention was for the Scharnhorst to leave Brest as too many large warships were now concentrated in one port. (Obviously, as events turned out, La Pallice was not sufficiently far away to avoid bombing attacks.) Koop appears to have excellent credentials as a WP:RS.

Secondly, (a) the readily available aerial photograph [4] and
(b) the account by RC Rivaz
both show/talk about the Scharnhorst lying alongside at La Pallice, rather than being anchored. Neither of these sources are precise about whether the ship was simply alongside on 23 Jun and then went to anchor, or was still moored alongside at the time of the attack. However, if the article uses the word "moored" then the ambiguity of that nautical word solves the problem. All we know for certain is that "anchored" has a good chance of being wrong.
ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 18:52, 29 December 2017 (UTC)

Inaccurate account of Glorious sinking in Garzke and Dulin?

(see also sections above, titled: Confusion and Incorrect times in account of Glorious/Ardent/Acasta action)

This article relies heavily on Garzke and Dulin for the account of the sinking of Glorious, Ardent and Acasta. Looking at other sources suggests that some of the details in Garzke and Dulin are wrong. Furthermore, Garzke and Dulin's account is relatively short, whereas much more comprehensive information is available elsewhere. At this stage, I have compared information with Koop and Schmolke and an analysis by Captain Vernon W. Howland[5]

Problems with the article/Garzke and Dulin are as follows:
(1) Distance at which Scharnhorst sighted Glorious. The article states this was 50km, whilst both Koop and Schmolke and Howland give this as 40km. As a check on this, if you use a height of eye calculator, the maximum distance that the masthead lookout would be able to detect another warship is around 40km. (The Scharnhorst lookout who first sighted Glorious, Midshipman Goos, was in the foretop. I don't have the height of eye for that part of the ship, but scaling off the plans in Koop and Schmolke, the masthead is 41m above the waterline - so giving an absolute maximum height. This gives a horizon distance of 22.9km. Presuming that enough visible superstructure, plus the small amount of smoke from Glorious is of a similar height, then that would be an additional 20km or so. So 40km is around the maximum distance that one could expect the sighting to have occurred. From discussion of the rangefinders in Koop and Schmolke, it would appear that the foretop is actually 35m above the waterline, giving a horizon distance of 21km, so shortening the distance a little. In any case, 50 km is clearly too much.)

(2) The article states that Scharnhorst opened fire first. This is incomplete and ambiguous. The first of the two German ships to open fire was the Gneisenau, using her secondary armament against Ardent. The Scharnhorst used her main armament against Glorious about 4 minutes later.

(3) The article gives the impression that the German ships' radar was useful in overcoming the smokescreens laid by the British ships. At this stage, both the battleships had the FuMO22 radar that had a maximum useful range of between 14 and 18km. Whilst this would have been useful for ranging the Ardent (14.5km opening range) , the Glorious was about 26km distant when Scharnhorst opened fire - with critical hits being achieved at not much less distance. The article's comments on radar are misleading by being incomplete.

(4) The article is not clear about when the German ships opened fire - it would be easy to believe from the article that this was a few minutes after the first sighting. Actually, there was a delay of 41 minutes between sighting and the order to open fire.

It appears that other editors on this article have made substantial reliance on Garzke and Dulin, but there is a clear case that this source is not adequate for this section of the article. Before starting a rewrite of the appropriate paragraphs, it seems sensible to see if anyone disputes the account in the two alternative sources given.
ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 00:37, 1 January 2018 (UTC)

References

Battle of North Cape

It is stated that Scharnhorst got back up from 5 to 22 knots after the damage by the shell that penetrated the boiler room was partially fixed. Then it is stated that it was pulling away from the British forces; which is false. It was pulling away before that shell penetrated, not after. The destroyers wouldn't have been able to catch up if it didn't take that hit. Top speed of Scharnhorst almost 32 knots, top speed of Duke of York about 27 knots. So Scharnhorst wouldn't be pulling away at 22 knots. The information just has to be repositioned. Thanks. Best wishes; David Torre

DaveTorre (talk) 07:15, 28 February 2019 (UTC)

Maximum speed in calm waters in peacetime is not the same as maximum speed in gale in December in the Arctic. Parsecboy (talk) 10:23, 28 February 2019 (UTC)

reasons for Cerberus

I question "....Operation Cerberus, would avoid the increasingly effective Allied radar and patrol aircraft in the Atlantic". My understanding, from a range of sources is that the following dictated the Kriegsmarine thinking:
(1)The network of supply ships that were pre-deployed in the Atlantic had been mopped up. (The Germans were unaware that this was largely due to effective signals intelligence by the British.) Operations by the steam turbine powered ships were not practical as they needed to be refuelled for any sortie to be meaningful.
(2) The Kriegsmarnie believed that Allied radar was much more effective than it really was - therefore they felt their ships were more easily detected than they had expected. In reality, this detection was largely down to the use of HF/DF which gave accurate fixes of German radio transmissions in a much shorter time than they believed possible.
(3) The continuing risk of damage by attacks by the RAF - which was rationalised by the Kriegsmarine as a failure by the Luftwaffe to protect Brest from attack.

Given some time, I could dig out all the sources for this - but my efforts are currently directed at other articles. Furthermore, other editors might have a different slant on this. Hence this note to put this point out for the opinions/efforts of others. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 22:37, 4 October 2021 (UTC)

It's been a while since I wrote that, but as I recall, the point of it was not a justification for relocating, but the reason they chose to run through the Channel (rather than return via the Denmark Strait - after what happened with Bismarck). I do think explaining the reasoning behind moving the ships should be added, though. Parsecboy (talk) 13:43, 5 October 2021 (UTC)

By the way, I got Koop & Schmolke's book last year, and while it's been on the back burner, I do plan on rewriting all 3 articles to bring them up to snuff for an eventual FAC. Parsecboy (talk) 14:05, 5 October 2021 (UTC)

I think some of the above "list of reasons" comes from Hellwinkel, Lars. Hitler's Gateway to the Atlantic: German Naval Bases in France 1940-1945 . Seaforth Publishing. For instance (no page number as I've pulled this off a Kindle version)
"In a situation report to Hitler one month earlier, Raeder had set out the Skl’s new plans for the operational use of the repaired ships. According to this, the high risk of air attacks made any further stay at Brest undesirable, and after a brief anti-shipping sortie in the North Atlantic the ships would return by the Iceland route."
The sort of sources used by Hellwinkel include: " Wagner, Lagevorträge, p. 147 (14.10.1940); Salewski, Seekriegsleitung, vol I, pp.269f and 375ff; Gerhard Bidlingmaier, Einsatz der schweren Kriegsmarineeinheiten im ozeanischen Zufuhrkrieg, Neckargemünd 1963; Gerhard Wagner, ‘Überlegungen der deutschen Marineführung zum Einsatz und Verlust der Schlachtschiffe während des Zweiten Weltkrieges’, in MGM (1/1974)", which you can paste into google translate as well as me, but looks to be a whole new range of German-language sources. (Of course, I apologise if you are fluent in German.)

I feel that the reasons for the withdrawal of these ships from Brest is key to the whole history of the German surface fleet and specifically to the Scharnhorst. In short a large amount of resource had been devoted to building, manning and then continually repairing these ships. In military "value for money" terms, they were probably the disaster that Hitler seems to have concluded they were. So the article would be deficient if it did not address whether or not the concept of these ships was (albeit with hindsight) a wise one. Yet the reasons why they were not a viable naval asset are complex and vary depending on the source. For instance the sources used by Hellwinkel are giving a German view from before the revelations of Enigma. It is not for a Wikipedia editor to do the job of a historian: putting this all together. But I think we can fairly identify that having an article that presents the full and correct picture needs sources with an up-to-date and broad overview. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 16:00, 5 October 2021 (UTC)

The trouble with pinning down the value issue is the lack of sources that address it and its sheer complexity. Tooze discusses it in Wages of Destruction, but only on the broadest of levels (i.e., the reallocation of precious steel production from the army to Plan Z in 1939 and the severe crimp that put on tanks, ammunition, etc.), so it'd be difficult (and probably WP:SYNTHy) to try to draw a comparison for individual ships. It also brings into question the wisdom of building (or planning to build) dozens of oil-fueled ships without sufficient access to the oil itself, something I raised in the Plan Z article. It definitely should be addressed in the Kriegsmarine article as well, but I do wonder if these things should really be covered in individual ship articles. It would open a large can of worms I don't know we'd want to mess with (the criticism would apply to most other navies as well - how much better off would the French Army have been in 1914 if the resources that had been allocated to the Mediterranean Fleet, which spent most of the war sitting idly at anchor, been used for more artillery, for instance?) There are also questions of hindsight bias to deal with - for example, sure, we know now that the Japanese never had a hope of defeating the US, but it wasn't so clear in 1937 when they started on the Yamatos. Parsecboy (talk) 19:31, 5 October 2021 (UTC)

On a related note - an article on the Operation Salvage operations that found the German supply ships would be nice. GraemeLeggett (talk) 17:38, 5 October 2021 (UTC)

That's a good idea - I know Nick-D has been working on related articles lately (like Operation Berlin (Atlantic) and Operation Nordseetour), maybe he'd be interested in working on it. Parsecboy (talk) 19:31, 5 October 2021 (UTC)

Yes, I get the point about 20/20 hindsight. However, the article could (?should) make clear the bad position that the Kriegsmarine surface fleet was in, just before Cerberus - because this is not necessarily clear to the general reader. If all the article seems to say is that the three ships were moved back to Germany, that is very different to German admirals deciding that they had to move the ships away from Brest, together with a realisation that Atlantic sorties were simply too risky. Looking at sources to hand, p 145-146 of Garzke and Dulin states that (a) all 3 ships would have to refuel if going back to Germany via either northern route, (b) almost all supply ships had been lost (c) "British air raids were increasing in severity and intensity". Koop and Schmolke (pg 111) make clear that the risk of air attack and the abandonment of plans for another Atlantic sortie (following the loss of Bismarck) left no alternative but to "evacuate" the three ships. Hellwinkel gives the useful summary that
"This meant that all three major warships at Brest were now non-operational. The anti-shipping war with heavy units planned by the Skl had thus come to nothing because they had no more major warships to send out. The heavy cruiser Lützow had been torpedoed and seriously damaged by a British submarine whilst attempting to break out into the North Atlantic on 13 June 1941 and the heavy cruisers Admiral Hipper and Admiral Scheer were both being overhauled in the yards. The new battleship Tirpitz was still working up.
Hellwinkel also mentions the rolling up of the supply ship network. Frustratingly, I seem to have mislaid my paper copy of Hellwinkel (building work, everything has been in boxes) so cannot give you a page number on this - it is towards the end of chapter 2. I have therefore reinstated the "strategic summary" at the end of the section before Operation Cerberus, with the reference - though I think one could verify all the facts from other sources. Not the end of the world if you don't feel the reinstated (and slightly expanded) paragraph has a place in the article - but I think we need something that gives a clue to the reader that the Kriegsmarine surface fleet was in a bad way at that point.

To address the "single ship article" point - it is the damage to Scharnhorst at La Pallice that was the "last straw" in the whole matter - hence why the overall strategic position being relevant in this article. Where else would the general reader gain this information?

The (hindsight) wisdom of turbine powered battleships compared to the fuel efficient diesel ships is briefly mentioned by Koop and Schmolke in their closing remarks - p164 - doesn't really say more than that. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 23:13, 5 October 2021 (UTC)

I don't disagree with you on any of that, adding context is generally never a bad thing. No rush on getting a page number for Hellwinkel, I won't likely have the time to get started on overhauling the article for a while (work has been a bear lately - we're significantly understaffed, so everyone is covering extra responsibilities, and the work of reading sources and rewriting existing content is one of the last things I want to do after killing myself at work ;-) Parsecboy (talk) 10:12, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

The issue over whether the surface fleet was a good use of production resources is possibly most relevant at the level of the U-boat versus surface ship debate. This was not only about the effort and resource of building and manning each type, but also about the necessary maintenance. Hellwinkel's work makes clear that a limiting factor for the U-boat war was how quickly U-boats could be handled in the Atlantic coast dockyards. Germany was desperately short of skilled dockyard workers - and the battery design of U-boats required a higher level of routine maintenance than with their Allied counterparts. Not a point to go into in this article, but something for Wikipedia to cover somewhere. ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 07:23, 6 October 2021 (UTC)

That illustrates how complex the question of resource allocation is - having more U-boats would just exacerbate the shortage of dockyard workers, right? Even assuming that extra boats would allow crews to rotate between them, this would eventually lead to degradation in their performance and increased attrition as the men wear out. One can't perform high-stress tasks like that indefinitely. Parsecboy (talk) 10:12, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

Just a thought, but one Scharnhorst, at 1,669 crew equals 32 type VII U-boats (52 crew). Retraining needed, of course, but many of the surface vessel crews did end up on U-boats over the course of the war. (Perhaps some of them were the survivor POWs who claimed they had been sent below decks at gunpoint at the start of their last trip.) Meanwhile the UK was worrying that too many men were in uniform and not enough in the mines and factories. Resource management had a big effect on progress of the war, if not on the final outcome. Consider the difficult to manufacture and somewhat unreliable Tiger tank which was built in modest quantities versus the inferior Sherman, built in massive quantities (similar for the better-performing T-34).
I'm not aware of an RS that brings all this high-level strategic stuff together.ThoughtIdRetired (talk) 20:07, 7 October 2021 (UTC)

chaff / Düppel used during operation Cerberus ?

i don't have a Garzke & Dulin at hand, could somebody check page 146 ? In Martin Middlebrooks 'Hamburg 1943' on p.69-70 ( German lang ) there are some details about the window / Düppel developments by Germany, and it says there that the Germans knew the principle of chaff, and out of fear maybe the British learned about it and use it against the german air defensive, it was forbidden in the Luftwaffe to even talk about it. So it is doubtfull they would use consider to use it themselves first. Also, I don't find any other source stating that Germans possessed chaff for use in 1942, the Düppel research was mid 1942. Nor did I find any other source mentioning chaff in operation Cerberus. Klutserke (talk) 19:38, 4 October 2023 (UTC)

The Germans used electronic radio jamming, not Duppel. It was absolutely forbidden to use Duppel under any circumstances in case the British found out about it. (They didn't know, of course, that the British had already discovered it.) Khamba Tendal (talk) 22:02, 18 November 2023 (UTC)

On p146 indeed Garzke & Dulin mention German airplanes used chaff, but that must be a mistake. I found another source ( Jones, R. V. (1978). Most Secret War: British Scientific Intelligence 1939–1945, page 383 ) which confirms Germans did not use chaff in 1942, with Göring even explicitly forbidding to discuss its existence. Klutserke (talk) 22:11, 11 March 2024 (UTC)

Inaccuracy with armor should be 320mm not 350mm

This affects both Scharnhorst’s page and the Page for the class.

The main belt is listed as 350mm, and to my knowledge this number originated from Janes, wich is known to have accuracy issues. It also partly originated from Gröner.

The proper thickness should be 320mm sourced from:

RM 25/15783 (Original Ship plans for Gneisenau) (using the given scale guide of 1:25) from 1938/39 plus others in the set.

RM 25/6319 shows it even better & straight up mentions the 320mm belt.

ONI lists it as 320mm (12.6in)

Gröner lists it as being 350mm, but this was most likely having very early 1936 plans.

Primary documents such as those shown in the Bundesarchiv should have president over secondary sources. Multiple other authors list it as 320mm (IE Whitley). if it says 340, it most likely is including the 20mm backing plate (cba to look up anymore information)

credits out to those who did the research for this on another area of the internet. I borrowed it. 166.181.85.49 (talk) 06:40, 8 February 2024 (UTC)

Another note is eventually to add that the armor belt tapered. 166.181.85.49 (talk) 06:47, 8 February 2024 (UTC)

Citing primary sources is generally not acceptable. You need to provide specific citations (i.e., including page numbers) in the article if you want to change the figures. Parsecboy (talk) 12:54, 8 February 2024 (UTC)